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Recent headlines tell a depressing tale of car bombs and truck bombs going off daily across Iraq. But a look at the history of such weapons shows they've been a weapon of choice for a wide variety of actors for much of this century, including terrorists, governments, and organized crime, gaining notoriety during Lebanon's long civil war as a weapon of mass terror as well as assassination. Like the bombs of Beirut, the bombs of Baghdad have proven both lethal and ubiquitous, causing near constant bloodshed in an effort to spread chaos and fear.

Most experts call car or truck bombs "VBIEDs," which is short for Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices. According to Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, a car bomb or truck bomb is an "improvised explosive device that is placed in a car or other vehicle and then exploded. It is commonly used as a weapon of assassination, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, to kill the occupant(s) of the vehicle or people near the blast site or to cause damage to buildings or other property." A truck bomb acts as its very own delivery vehicle, delivering a substantial bang for not only a minimal buck, but also in a tremendously stealthful manner.

As the insurgency in Iraq has gained momentum, VBIEDs have become an oft-used tool against coalition forces, our new Iraqi allies, and even the United Nations, whose Iraq headquarters was destroyed on August 19, 2003 by a VBIED - killing the UN's administrator and 21 of his colleagues. But VBIEDs aren't a new phenomenon.

VBIEDs have been a fact of life since the very first vehicles appeared. Records indicate an early truck bomb - more accurately, a horse-drawn carriage bomb - was detonated on Wall Street back in 1920 by anarchists. As reported by InfoPlease.com on September 16, 1920, a "TNT bomb planted in unattended horse-drawn wagon exploded on Wall Street opposite House of Morgan, killing 35 people and injuring hundreds more. Bolshevist or anarchist terrorists believed responsible, but crime never solved."

From Beirut to Baghdad

Until the 1980s, VBIEDs were relatively infrequent; but this changed with the disintegration of Lebanon during its long civil war, especially after U.S. forces entered the fray in a peacekeeping capacity. During the 1980s, at least four VBIED attacks took place against American targets in the Middle East, as chronicled by InfoPlease.com. On April 18, 1983, a massive truck bomb destroyed the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. Then on October 23 of that year, Shi'ite suicide bombers exploded a truck bomb disguised as a delivery truck outside U.S. military barracks at the Beirut airport, killing 241 Marines. And just a few moments later, a second bomb killed 58 French paratroopers in their barracks in West Beirut. On December 12, 1983 in Kuwait City, Shi'ite truck bombers attacked the U.S. embassy and other targets - killing 5 and injuring 80. And on September 20, 1984 in East Beirut, a truck bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy annex, killing 24.

In the 1990s, truck bomb attacks were launched on American soil as well as against U.S. military and diplomatic targets overseas. Among the most notable was on February 26, 1993, in New York, when Ramzi Yousef joined forces with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, deploying a truck bomb using ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with fuel oil in the basement garage of the World Trade Center, in a failed effort to topple the Twin Towers and kill tens of thousands. In the end, only six were killed but over 1,000 were injured, and the towers stood, untoppled.

Two years later, on April 19, 1995, when Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols decided to bring their personal war against the U.S. government to Oklahoma City, a truck bomb was detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, killing 268 people, and injuring many more. Just over six months later, on November 13, 1995, a VBIED bomb exploded at U.S. military headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing 5 U.S. military servicemen, and around a half year later, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded outside Khobar Towers military complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American servicemen, and injuring hundreds more. Two years after that, al Qaeda used truck bombs to simultaneously attack the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998, killing 224 in all (213 in Kenya, and 11 in Tanzania), and injuring nearly 5,000 more. In many ways, the September 11, 2001 attacks were the mother of all VBIED attacks - with the vehicle delivering the deadly payload escalating from truck to jumbo jet, and instead of packing a plane with explosives, the perpetrators harnessed the vehicles' own full fuel tanks as the explosive agent.

In the ongoing low-intensity slugfest that has defined the Global War on Terror (GWOT) since 9/11, the truck bomb has continued to be a weapon of choice by al Qaeda and its sympathizers around the world - especially since increased airport and cockpit security has made a repeat of the 9/11-styled airborne IED attacks far more difficult to execute. But inside Iraq, VBIEDs have been alarmingly frequent, including the August 7, 2003 truck bomb attack of the Jordanian Embassy, which, as CNN reported, killed ten people, and the notorious attack of the United Nations headquarters on August 19th, killing the top UN envoy to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and sixteen others, and injuring over a hundred more "when a bomb-laden cement truck exploded beneath the window of his office in the Canal Hotel at about 4:30 p.m."

Historical VBIED Trends

Wikipedia has compiled a long list of VBIED attacks through the end of 2005 - including mass terror attacks and more specific VBIED assassinations. A big spike in VBIED attacks in Iraq corresponds with the start of the insurgency against the Coalition. In May 2003, intelligence officials report a pivotal planning meeting took place in a car in Baghdad - where, according to CNN, Saddam Hussein's deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, and four other top Saddam loyalists, "decided to activate an insurgency."

From May 2003 through the end of 2005, there were 51 VBIED mass-terror attacks worldwide - of which 37 took place in Iraq and only 12 elsewhere, including three attacks in Saudi Arabia; two attacks in Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Russia (including Chechnya, which is fighting Moscow for independence); and one attack in Lebanon, Indonesia, and India during this period. 13 of the Iraqi attacks in this period used multiple, often simultaneous or near-simultaneous VBIEDs - with as many as 11 vehicles used in a single attack, though most multiple vehicle-borne IED attacks use far fewer (four Iraqi attacks used four vehicles, three used three vehicles, and four used two vehicles, while only one attack used five vehicles, and only one used 11.) Outside Iraq, only two other nations experienced multiple-VBIED attacks during this period: India with a two-vehicle attack on August 25, 2003; and Saudi Arabia with a four-vehicle attack on May 12, 2003.

Interestingly, from the start of 2000 until May 2003, there were only 16 VBIED mass-terror attacks around the world. There was just one VBIED attack in 2003 before the Iraq insurgency began - on February 7th in Colombia. And in 2002, there were 11 VBIED terror attacks around the world - two in Pakistan , two in Israel, one in Chechnya, one in Kenya, one in Indonesia, one in Afghanistan, ,one in Tunisia, one in Colombia, and one in Peru. In 2001, there were only three attacks - one in Russia, one in Chechnya, and one in Kashmir. And in 2000, there was only one VBIED attack recorded - in Chechnya. In only four cases were more than 100 people killed in a single attack since 2000.

In contrast to the past few years of prolific VBIED attacks, during the entire 1990s there were only 28 attacks worldwide, far fewer than the 37 VBIED attacks recorded in the 1980s. In the 1990s, there were: 1 attack in 1999, 4 in 1998, 2 in 1997, 4 in 1996, 6 in 1995, 2 in 1994, 6 in 1993, 2 in 1992, and 1 in 1990. Only three of these attacks resulted in over 100 people killed. In the 1980s, there were 4 VBIED attacks in 1989, 3 in 1988, 5 in 1987, 3 in 1986, 5 in 1985, 1 in 1984, 9 in 1983, 4 in 1982, and 3 in 1981. Only two attacks in the entire 1980s resulted in over 100 killed.

For the six decades from 1920 to 1980, there were only 8 VBIED attacks in total around the world, including 3 in 1948 in Palestine. The most lethal VBIED attack in this period resulted in 52 deaths. As for VBIED assassinations of the sort portrayed in mafia films, 24 are recorded - 9 in Lebanon, 4 in Iraq, 3 in the U.S., 2 in the UK, 2 in Turkey, 1 in Argentina, 1 in Spain, 1 in Greece, and 1 in Qatar.

DHS Responds with Frequent Advisories & Bulletins

The threat of VBIEDs is now so ubiquitous that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) routinely issues Homeland Security Threat Advisories and Information Bulletins as part of the Homeland Security Advisory System often relating to the VBIED threat, and responding to changes in tactics observed in overseas attacks.

DHS' Homeland Security Threat Advisories "contain actionable information about an incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical national networks or infrastructures or key assets," whereas its Homeland Security Information Bulletins "communicate information of interest to the nation's critical infrastructures that do not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance thresholds of warning messages."

A fairly recent Information Bulletin, issued on July 30, 2004, was titled "Potential Threat to Homeland Using Heavy Transport Vehicles," which was a joint DHS and FBI information bulletin whose aim was "to sensitize state and local authorities and the private sector responsible for security of critical infrastructure and key resources to the potential for terrorists to use heavy transport vehicles as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) against a range of attractive targets in the US," as noted in the Ryder Safety Services September/October 2004 newsletter.

And, a joint DHS and FBI advisory from August 1, 2004 titled "Homeland Security Advisory System Increased to ORANGE for Financial Institutions in Specific Geographical Areas" raised the United States Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level for the financial services sectors in New York City, Northern New Jersey, and Washington, DC, from "YELLOW - ELEVATED" to "ORANGE - HIGH." The advisory notes that "recent credible and specific intelligence reporting indicates terrorist operatives have done extensive research and reconnaissance activity against major U.S. and international financial institutions in Washington, DC, Northern New Jersey and New York City," including the Citigroup buildings in the New York City area, the New York Stock Exchange Building in New York City, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Buildings in Washington DC, and the Prudential Insurance Company of America in Newark, New Jersey. The advisory points out that "the reporting provides a level of detail that is unusually specific, to include information about the interior configurations of these buildings, as well as infrastructure, services, and buildings that surround the targets of interest," and while it "does not specify the timing or mode of attack. Based on the nature of the reconnaissance information," the advisory states "the most likely means of attack would be a Vehicular-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), to include limousines, large vans, trucks, and oil tankers which could be placed in underground parking areas or near highly populated entrance ways." The advisory refers to an earlier joint DHS/FBI Information Bulletin "Potential Threat to Homeland Using Heavy Transport Vehicles," issued on 30 July 2004, that "outlines terrorist use of VBIEDs overseas as well as in the United States."

The August 1, 2004 advisory presents some "Suggested Protective Measures For Personnel At The Affected Locations," listed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Personnel Protective Measures

A year earlier on May 15, 2003, DHS issued a Homeland Security Information Bulletin specifically on VBIED prevention titled "Potential Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)," which explains that DHS "believes that a truck bombing by terrorists may be preempted if the general public remains alert for certain indicators," and as such aims "to provide general information to assist in efforts to recognize potential VBIED-related threats or incidents based on recent Riyadh bombings." It notes tactics used in that week's May 11th Riyadh attack include multiple targets, simultaneous attacks, multiple vehicles per target, and an assault/breaching cadre armed with small arms/weaponry accompany the VBIED to clear security personnel and gain access to the compound."

The bulletin includes a detailed tactical analysis of the Riyadh attack, and explains that "while the ability to conduct multiple, near simultaneous attacks against several targets is not new for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida, the manner in which these attacks was conducted indicates a more refined capability," noting how "in each attack a number of armed terrorists was used to eliminate the security elements guarding the compounds so suicide cadre could drive a vehicle borne improvised explosive device to the desired location and detonate it."

The bulletin presents some "potential VBIED indicators," including:

· Purchase or theft of explosives or chemicals may be a precursor to terrorist attacks: Ramsi Yousef-the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center (WTC) attack-purchased the required chemicals directly from a chemical manufacturer. Timothy McVeigh-the perpetrator of the attack on the Murrah Federal Building-used a combination of theft and small purchases over a six (6) week period to amass the necessary ingredients used to assemble his explosive device. For a full list of potential chemicals used in a VBIED attack, see Table 2.

· Rental of self-storage units and the delivery of chemicals to such units: Both Ramsi Yousef and Timothy McVeigh rented self-storage units in order to store chemicals. Ramsi Yousef had the chemical manufacturer deliver $3,400 in chemicals directly to his self-storage unit.

· Chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotels rooms, or self-storage units: Self-storage site managers, motel/hotel staff, and apartment superintendents may wish to be sensitive to any fires, toxic odors, bright stains, or rusted metal fixtures within their facilities. In attempting to prepare an improvised explosive device in the Philippines following the 1993 WTC attack, Ramsi Yousef caused a violent chemical fire to break out in the kitchen where he was preparing his device. Subsequent investigation of this apartment revealed bright stains and rusted metal fixtures (i.e., door hinges, window locks, etc.) throughout the apartment.

· Theft of truck or van with minimum one (1) ton carrying capacity: The 1993 WTC attack and 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building were carried out with rented vehicles. However, terrorists may use a stolen vehicle in order to impede subsequent investigation. Moreover, most VBIEDs used in recent years have carried large explosive charge that weighed in excess of 2,000 pounds suggesting that continued use of large vans, SUVs or trucks for this purpose is likely.

· Modification of smaller capacity vehicles to accept a minimum one (1) ton load: The two vehicles used in the 1998 East Africa bombings were imported into the target country and then locally modified with heavier springs in order to accommodate the weight of the explosive. Local law enforcement may wish to coordinate with appropriate garages or auto mechanic trade associations in their jurisdictions to sensitize them to this indicator.

· Small test explosions in rural or wooded areas: Timothy McVeigh detonated at least one small explosive device in a wooded area near his residence in order to test his chemical mixture. Local law enforcement, as well as fire and rescue departments, may be in the best position to report this indicator to the FBI.

· Treated/untreated chemical burns or missing hands and/or fingers: Terrorists may seriously injure themselves while manufacturing their bomb that they require immediate and substantial medical care. Hospitals and out-patient clinics should therefore be requested to report such injuries.

· Purchase of, or illicit access to, blue prints of the targeted facility: In a failed 1996 attempt to destroy the FBI's fingerprint facility in Clarksburg, WV, a domestic anti-government group attempted to acquire the facility's blue prints from a local emergency services worker. Receiving offices may wish to sensitize local fire and rescue departments, and architectural firms, to the possibility that terrorists may attempt to acquire a targeted facility's blue prints from local emergency services worker.

· Physical surveillance: Nearly every major terrorist attack is preceded by a thorough surveillance of the targeted facility. It is likely that similar activity preceded the Riyadh compound bombings. Terrorist surveillance may be either fixed, mobile or progressive. Terrorists are known to use advances in technology such as modern optoelectronics, communications equipment, video cameras, and other electronic equipment. Such advances include commercial and military night-vision devices, GPS systems, and cellular phones. It should be assumed that many terrorists have access to high-dollar technological equipment.

· Protective Measures: Terrorists continue to select soft targets for attack - particularly those that will yield a high casualty count. Some examples, though not all inclusive, are: residences, recreational and shopping venues, and business buildings and complexes. All available antiterrorism measures should be rigorously reexamined - to include: physical security perimeters set back distances between security fences and key buildings, and barricades. See Table 3 for a detailed list of VBIED protective measures.

Table 2: Chemicals and Other Demolitions Paraphernalia Used in Recent Truck Bomb Attacks Against US Government Facilities

Source: Risk Assessment Division, Information Analysis Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

Table 3: Protective Measures Against VBIED Attack

Source: DHS Homeland Security Information Bulletin on VBIED prevention, "Potential Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)," May 15, 2003.

A July 22, 2003 DHS Information Bulletin, titled "Potential Terrorist Use of Official Identification, Uniforms, or Vehicles," warns that "Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups likely view the theft or other illegal acquisition of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles as an effective way to increase access and decrease scrutiny in furtherance of planning and operations." It observes that "terrorist groups have utilized police or military uniforms to mask their identities and achieve closer access to their targets without arousing suspicion. This was illustrated in the December 2002, suicide bombings that targeted the Chechen Government Headquarters in Groznyy, Russia." As well, it recounts how "terrorists in South America, the Philippines and Pakistan have commandeered or stolen emergency medical services vehicles and uniforms (or cleverly designed imitations) to facilitate the execution of their attacks on key facilities." DHS notes that "in an effort to understand the extent of official identification, uniform, and vehicle thefts, DHS recently conducted a survey of selected members of the law enforcement community in five states" which "revealed that from February to May 2003 hundreds of official identification cards, badges, decals, uniforms, and government license plates were reported stolen or lost." At the same time, DHS found "a number of private companies have reported receiving suspicious inquiries about renting official delivery vehicles and emergency services representatives have received unusual requests for detailed vehicle descriptions."

DHS observes that "the worldwide proliferation of individuals or 'companies' that traffic in high-quality imitations of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles is a related issue that increases the possibility such items could be used to facilitate future terrorist attacks, and further complicates efforts to prevent their acquisition." DHS recalls how earlier in July 2003, "the New York City High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Force reported that it had identified a Japanese website selling near exact replicas of badges from law enforcement agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Marshals Service, and Los Angeles Police Department," while "several press reports this year have referred to the theft and sale over the Internet of a large number of United Parcel Service (UPS) uniforms," though "these reports proved to be false." In ­Table 4, DHS presents some protective measures.

Table 4: Protective Measures

A DHS Advisory issued on September 4, 2003, titled "Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al-Qaeda's Potential Threats to the Homeland," aimed at Federal Departments and Agencies, Homeland Security Advisors, First Responders and Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, noted that based upon "a recent interagency review of available information leading up to the September 11th anniversary, we remain concerned about Al-Qaeda's continued efforts to plan multiple attacks against the US and US interests overseas." And while "Al-Qaeda's primary intent is to conduct synchronized attacks against US interests," DHS explains that "recent terrorist incidents overseas highlight the possibility that Al-Qaeda could opt to conduct lower-scale attacks against 'softer' target sets." DHS noted the continued threat to critical infrastructure, and that "Al-Qaeda views critical infrastructure targets in the US as attractive attack options because of their potentially significant economic and psychological impacts." It explains that a "demonstrated capability of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations against an infrastructure-type target involves the use of a vehicle carrying a large amount of explosives, commonly referred to as a car or truck bomb," as "this tactic allows for attacks to be conducted without entering a facility and requires a protective strategy to include areas outside the controlled perimeter."

DHS observes that there's "no standard type of vehicle associated with vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)" and that "vehicle selection depends on vehicles common to and available in a region as well as the security posture of the intended target." DHS explains "the typical tactic for the employment of a VBIED is to drive a single vehicle to the target, park the vehicle, and allow the vehicle to detonate via time delay or by remote control" and that "another tactic is the use of suicide drivers, driving up to the target and detonating the vehicle by use of a 'dead-man' switch." DHS also notes "in the case of the Riyadh, Saudi Arabia compound bombings this May, we saw a change in tactics from the 'traditional' tactic of driving a single VBIED to a target, to confronting security personnel with assault teams equipped with small arms to gain access through the perimeter in order to allow suicide VBIEDs to gain entry to the target area."

A more detailed DHS Information Bulletin on the VBIED threat was issued on November 10, 2003, titled "Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)," which was aimed at Homeland Security Advisors, Security Managers, and Chemical and Energy Information Sharing Centers. In its overview, DHS explains that "the use of VBIEDs allow terrorists to place large amounts of explosives against hard or soft targets with a high degree of mobility - in effect turning these VBIEDs into precision weapons that cause mass casualties and physical destruction." And while they "require less coordination, planning, expertise, material, and money than the more spectacular type of terrorist methods, such as aircraft hijackings or employment of weapons of mass destruction, " DHS points out they can "still can achieve the mass casualty objective." DHS recalls that a "recent VBIED operation in Riyadh on 8 November 2003 was conducted against a housing compound inhabited by various nationalities, but mostly Arabs" and that "it appears the attackers either stole a Saudi military/police vehicle or painted a vehicle to resemble one" and that the "operatives entered the compound by disguising themselves as Saudi security/police," and that they "wore security uniforms and drove two vehicles into the compound with at least one vehicle similar to that used by police." Both "the May and November Riyadh bombings signal a change in tactics from simply driving a single VBIED to a target to tactics in which multiple vehicles are used and security personnel are confronted with assault teams equipped with small arms to gain access through the perimeter in order to allow suicide VBIEDs to gain entry to the target area," and that "in the most recent incident this tactic was modified to include armed confrontation coupled with the use of uniforms and vehicles that appear to be from security or law enforcement."

As with the DHS May 15, 2003 Information Bulletin, a list of potential VBIED indicators and protective measures is included.

VBIEDs are now such a regular part of our threat landscape that the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) has a table that presents the relative size and effective range of various sizes of VBIEDs - from the compact sedan, whose maximum explosive capacity is 500 pounds and lethal air blast range is 100 feet, with a falling glass hazard of 1,250 feet; all the way up to the semi-trailer, whose maximum explosive capacity is 60,000 pounds, and whose lethal air blast range is 600 feet - with a falling glass hazard of 7,000 feet:

Figure 1: BATF Explosive Standards





An Elusive Shield?

The rising frequency of VBIED attacks suggests they are, for terrorists, a magic bullet, a weapon of choice that can not be easily thwarted. Efforts have been made to reduce the threat, such as DHS' detailed lists of VBIED indicators and protective measures.

On August 8, 2004, Spencer S. Hsu and Sari Horwitz authored a detailed article as part of "THE WORLD AFTER 9/11" in the Washington Post, titled "The Truck Bomb Threat: Impervious Shield Elusive Against Drive-By Terrorists." They report on government efforts across the U.S. to measure and assess the potential destructiveness, and thereby mitigate and prevent VBIED attacks. They calculate that the U.S. had spent over $1B by the summer of 2004 on "efforts to stop a single threat: the explosion of a car or truck bomb at a government installation or other structure." And yet, some "11 years after Muslim extremists used an explosives-laden van to attack the World Trade Center and nearly three years after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, even senior federal agents acknowledge that the country has virtually no defense against a terrorist barreling down the street with a truck bomb."

Hsu and Horwitz explain that "the government has been racing to devise ways to systematically detect and warn against plotters creating truck bombs," but add "those efforts are embryonic at best, government officials say, even as al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists have used the truck bomb time and again overseas and the threat to use it here is growing." They note "the frustrating struggle to thwart terrorists' low-tech, low-cost weapon of choice provides a case study of America's challenge in waging the fight in the post 9/11 world - a fight in which the enemy is hiding and the traditional role of soldiers and weapons takes a back seat to intelligence and prevention," and a "war in which the United States, with all its technological and economic advantages, has been unable to develop protection against a self-taught bomber assembling large amounts of explosives in secret, acquiring a vehicle and fading into the landscape before detonating a payload."

However, there has been steady progress - and "since the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the government has hardened federal buildings and military facilities at home and abroad; passed laws restricting the sale of explosives and shipments of hazardous materials; inspected thousands of people who deal with explosives; and researched explosive-detection and vehicle-disabling technology." Around Washington, they note, "blast walls, barricades and setbacks at sensitive buildings have become the last line of defense," and "the Pentagon, White House and Capitol increasingly resemble fortresses." Accordingly, "defensive measures costing hundreds of millions of dollars are proposed or underway at more than 20 facilities, and the government has adopted a 100-foot setback as a guideline for high-security new construction in the United States and overseas." But as evidenced in Iraq, "hardening some locations might redirect terrorists to 'softer' ones, including hotels, malls or stadiums."

Other methods to reduce the threat of VBIEDs in America include the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's) $19M grant to the American Trucking Associations (ATA), which in 1933 was established by a national affiliation of state trucking organizations, to expand its Highway Watch program, described by Hsu and Horwitz as a "computerized instant-reporting network through which professional drivers and highway workers can report accidents, thefts, hazards and suspicious incidents nationwide." They cite ATA consultant Jeff Beatty, who explained: "We are the point men. We are the Distant Early Warning line for the trucking security problem." Additionally, DHS has conducted background checks of commercial drivers of hazardous materials (hazmat), and now collects drivers' fingerprints. Even fertilizer, a common ingredient in VBIEDs, is more closely watched now. Hsu and Horwitz report that in July 2004, "the fertilizer industry urged ammonium nitrate sellers to voluntarily track sales and require buyers to show identification," part of its steady "history of voluntary initiatives" - such as how in 1996, "the Fertilizer Institute and ATF unveiled a 'Be Aware for America' campaign after the Oklahoma City bombing, distributing 30,000 brochures and asking industry members to report suspicious activities." And in 2001, "they launched another education campaign, 'Be Secure for America,' encouraging manufacturers, distributors and retailers to prevent theft." And in April 2004, "after the arrest of alleged terrorists in England, ATF met again with industry officials and rolled out 'America's Security Begins with You," whose "mission was to raise awareness and ask for voluntary reporting of thefts or unexplained losses." Another preventive effort is the Safe Explosives Act, which "requires users and sellers of explosives to submit photographs and fingerprints and undergo criminal background checks."

Despite these efforts, the very magnitude of the problem is uniquely challenging. As Hsu and Horwitz explain, "there are 23.8 million trucks used for business purposes in the United States and 70 million more in personal use," and "unlike commercial aviation, motor vehicles are not registered by a single federal agency" and are "not based at a fixed number of airports or operated by a small number of companies controlling access to them." Indeed, "there are 600,000 trucking companies, which have 2.6 million tractors, 3.1 million big-rig drivers and 5 million trailers." As for fertilizer, there's "nearly 5 million tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer are sold each year in the United States." That's why Hsu and Horwitz caution that "at the end of the day, the nation's security experts say they expect terrorists will get their hands on the weapon and that keeping bombers away from buildings is their best hope."

Bunker Aesthetics

Protecting against VBIEDs requires a layered approach to perimeter security. According to FEMA's Risk Management Series, in particular Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 452/January 2005), there are three layers of defense to consider: the first (outer-most), second, and third (inner-most). The first layer of defense "involves understanding the characteristics of the surrounding area, including construction type, occupancies, and the nature and intensity of adjacent activities. It is specifically concerned with buildings, installations, and infrastructure outside the site perimeter. For urban areas, it also includes the curb lane and surrounding streets." The second layer of defense "refers to the space that exists between the site perimeter and the assets requiring protection. It involves the placement of buildings and forms in a particular site and understanding which natural or physical resources can provide protection. It entails the design of access points, parking, roadways, pedestrian walkways, natural barriers, security lighting, and signage. For urban areas, it refers specifically to the building yard."

And the third layer of defense "deals with the protection of the asset itself. It proposes to harden the structures and systems, incorporate effective HVAC systems and surveillance equipment, and wisely design and locate utilities and mechanical systems. Note that, of all blast mitigation measures, distance is the most effective measure because other measures vary in effectiveness and can be more costly. However, often it is not possible to provide adequate stand-off distance. For example, sidewalks in many urban areas may be less than 10 meters (33 feet), while appropriate stand-off may require a minimum of 25 meters (82 feet)."

Bunker Aesthetics

Protecting a potential target from a truck bomber may not be rocket science - but designing its perimeter security in a manner that blends into the urban landscape could be described as rocket art - requiring an aesthetic reassessment as the nation's capital and other high-priority targets in the United States start to look more and more like a bunker, flanked with concrete 'Jersey Barriers' - those ubiquitous highway barrier dotting construction zones across America's vast highway system. The mechanics are well understood - and now, with security concerns top of mind around the world, the aesthetics are at last being addressed.

As reported in "Security's New Disguise: Pieces of Modern Art" by Mark Maremont of the Wall Street Journal, as reposted on RealEstateJournal.com on July 1, 2004: "After the Oklahoma City bombing and the Sept. 11 attacks, worried building owners threw up rows of concrete highway barriers and mammoth planters around many office buildings." But in the years since, "it's clear that security concerns aren't going away, corporate and public officials have begun to seek more aesthetically pleasing shields." As a result, "decorative bollards, crash-proof benches and modern-day moats are blending into the American cityscape almost unnoticed," and "in the process, they have created a new subspecialty for architects, engineers and landscape designers - all of whom now must be as well-versed in 'antiram rating levels' and 'standoff distances' as they are in elementary drafting."

More recently, on January 29, 2006 in "Ubiquitous Security Barriers Get a Fashionable Flourish," Petula Dvorak, a staff writer at the Washington Post observed how "bollards, those crude posts once relegated to parking lots and now considered a necessity in a security-conscious era, have become as fashionable and versatile as handbags," and "they now come in a jaunty nautical style. And a somber federalist version. There's a shiny, sleek modernist type, a pueblo model - some even fashioned into giant, pseudo golf balls. Whether made of copper or bronze, aluminum or granite, all could stop an eight-ton truck barreling into them at 50 mph."

Maremont explains this recent "intertwining of security and architecture is a throwback to antiquity," and recalls that "from medieval English castles to the Great Wall of China, structures throughout history have been built with defense in mind." Indeed, he notes that "only in relatively recent times have cities and buildings been constructed on the assumption that they were safe from attack." In the post 9/11 era, he observes that "many new building perimeters are designed to keep vehicles at what security types call a safe 'standoff distance' - preventing the nightmare scenario of a truck bomb penetrating into a modern tower's vulnerable core, where an explosion could trigger a catastrophic collapse." As Curt Betts, a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers blast expert, explained to Maremont, "a large vehicle bomb produces just one-eighth as much blast force on a building from 50 feet away as it does from 25 feet. Moving to 100 feet cuts that to just 2%."

These new aesthetics of security have worked their way to Washington, DC, which in recent years has started to resemble, more and more, a city at war - with Jersey barriers flanking every government office building in the nation's capital, and as described by Maremont, "large parts of which have taken on the look of a military bunker." That's why "the National Capital Planning Commission, the federal government's urban-planning arm for the District of Columbia, was so upset about the ugly and often frightening fortifications it devised a sweeping 'urban design and security plan' for the city," and "one of the agency's first projects is already under way: Replacing the Jersey barriers now circling the Washington Monument with gentle, oval-shaped walls built of granite but with a rustic look." As well, he notes "a longer-range plan is to get rid of what the commission calls 'bunker pots' - outsize, concrete urns lining some of Washington's historic avenues," and "in their place would go 'hardened street furniture,' including special benches and reinforced decorative lampposts." Indeed, "even the humble Washington trash can is supposed to morph into a security device."